WaveCluster is an important family of grid-based clustering algorithms that are capable of finding clusters of arbitrary shapes. In this paper, we investigate techniques to perform WaveCluster while ensuring differential privacy. Our goal is to develop a general technique for achieving differential privacy on WaveCluster that accommodates different wavelet transforms. We show that straightforward techniques based on synthetic data generation and introduction of random noise when quantizing the data, though generally preserving the distribution of data, often introduce too much noise to preserve useful clusters. We then propose two optimized techniques, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM , which can significantly reduce data distortion during two key steps of WaveCluster: the quantization step and the significant grid identification step. We conduct extensive experiments based on four datasets that are particularly interesting in the context of clustering, and show that PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM achieve high utility when privacy budgets are properly allocated, conforming to our theoretical analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Clustering is an important class of data analysis, which allows data analysts to gain valuable insights into data distribution when it is challenging to make hypotheses on raw data. Among various clustering techniques, a grid-based clustering algorithm called WaveCluster [33, 34] is famous for detecting clusters of arbitrary shapes. WaveCluster relies on wavelet transforms, a family of convolutions with appropriate kernel functions, to convert data into a Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. transformed space, where the natural clusters in the data become more distinguishable.
In many data-analysis scenarios, when the data being analyzed contains personal information and the result of the analysis needs to be shared with the public or untrusted third parties, sensitive private information may be leaked, e.g., whether certain personal information is stored in a database or has contributed to the analysis. For example, the participation of one record may causes two clusters to be merged as one in the WaveCluster results. Thus, merely from the number of clusters returned (rather than which data points belong to which cluster), an adversary may infer a user's participation. Due to such potential leak of private information, data holders may be reluctant to share the original data or data-analysis results with each other or with the public.
In this paper, we develop techniques to perform WaveCluster with differential privacy [12, 14] . Differential privacy provides a provable strong privacy guarantee that the output of a computation is insensitive to any particular individual. In other words, based on the output, an adversary has limited ability to make inference about whether an individual is present or absent in the dataset. Differential privacy is often achieved by the perturbation of randomized algorithms, and the privacy level is controlled by a parameter called "privacy budget". Intuitively, the privacy protection via differential privacy grows stronger as grows smaller.
WaveCluster provides a framework that allows any kind of wavelet transform to be plugged in for data transformation, such as the Haar transform [3] and Biorthogonal transform [26] . There are various wavelet transforms that are suitable for different types of applications, such as image compression and signal processing [4] . Plugged in different wavelet transforms, WaveCluster can leverage different properties of the data, such as frequency and location, for finding the dense regions as clusters. Thus, in this paper, we aim to develop a general technique for achieving differential privacy on WaveCluster that accommodates different wavelet transforms.
We first consider a general technique, Baseline, that adapts existing differentially private data-publishing techniques to WaveCluster through synthetic data generation. Specifically, we could generate synthetic data based on any data model of the original data that is published through differential privacy, and then apply WaveCluster using any wavelet transform over the synthetic data. Baseline seems particularly promising as many effective differentially private data-publishing techniques have been proposed in the literature, all of which strive to preserve some important properties of the original data. Therefore, hopefully the "shape" of the original data is also preserved in the synthetic data, and consequently could be discovered by WaveCluster. Unfortunately, this synthetic datageneration technique often cannot produce accurate results, and the reasons are as follows. Differentially private data-publishing techniques such as spatial decompositions [10] , adaptive-grid [31] , and Privelet [37] , output noisy descriptions of the data distribution and often contain negative counts for sparse partitions due to random noise. These negative counts do not affect the accuracy of large range queries (which is often one of the main utility measures in private data publishing) since zero-mean noise distribution smooths the effect of negative counts. However, in the synthetic dataset, negative counts cannot be smoothed away, which are typically set to zero counts. Thus, such synthetic data generation significantly distorts the data distribution and reduces the accuracy of the WaveCluster results, such as the example shown in Figure 1 .
Motivated by the above challenge, we propose three techniques that enforce differential privacy on the key steps of WaveCluster, rather than relying on synthetic data generation. WaveCluster accepts as input a set of data points in a multi-dimensional space, and consists of the following main steps. First, in the quantization step WaveCluster quantizes the multi-dimensional space by dividing the space into grids, and computes the count of the data points in each grid. These counts of grids form a count matrix M . Second, in the wavelet transform step WaveCluster applies a wavelet transform on the count matrix M to obtain the approximation of the multi-dimensional space. Third, in the significant grid identification step WaveCluster identifies significant grids based on the predefined density threshold. Fourth, in the cluster identification step WaveCluster outputs as clusters the connected components from these significant grids [21] .
To enforce differential privacy on WaveCluster, we first propose a technique, PrivQT, that introduces Laplacian noise to the quantization step. However, such straightforward privacy enforcement cannot produce usable private WaveCluster results, since the noise introduced in this step significantly distorts the number of significant grids (k) in the output. To address this issue, we further propose two techniques, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM , which enforce differential privacy on both the quantization step and the significant grid identification step. These two techniques differ in how to accurately determine k , the private version of k. To quantify the proposed techniques' utility, we present theoretical bounds for k and the noise magnitude introduced in the quantization step, which allow a theoretical comparison between different techniques.
Traditionally, the effectiveness of WaveCluster is evaluated through visual inspection by human experts (i.e., visually determining whether the discovered clusters match those reflected in the user's mind) [33, 34] . Unfortunately, visual inspection is not quantitative, and thus it is inappropriate to systematically compare the impact of different techniques through visual inspection. Generally, researchers use quantitative measures to assess the utility of differentially private results, such as relative or absolute errors for range queries and accuracy for classification. But there is no existing utility measures for density-based clustering algorithms with differential privacy.
To mitigate this problem, we propose two types of utility measures. The first is to measure the dissimilarity between true and private WaveCluster results by measuring the differences of significant grids and clusters, which correspond to the outputs of the two key steps (the significant grid identification and the cluster identification) in WaveCluster. To more intuitively understand the usefulness of discovered clusters, our second utility measure considers one concrete application of cluster analysis, i.e., to build a classifier based on discovered clusters, and then use that classifier to predict future data. Thus, the prediction accuracy of the classifier from one aspect reflects the actual utility of private WaveCluster.
To evaluate the proposed techniques, our experiments use four datasets containing different data shapes that are interesting in the context of clustering [1, 9] . Our results show that PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM achieve high utility for both types of utility measures, and are superior to Baseline and PrivQT. The results also indicate that PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM can accurately estimate k when proper budgets are allocated in the quantization and significant grid identification steps, which conforms to our theoretical analysis.
RELATED WORK
The syntactic approaches for privacy preserving clustering [18] is to output k-anonymous clusters. Friedman et al. [17] presented an algorithm to output k-anonymous clusters by using minimum spanning tree. Karakasidis et al. [22] created k-anonymous clusters by merging clusters so that each cluster contains at least k key values of the records. However, these approaches only satisfy syntactic privacy notions such as k-anonymity, and cannot provide formal guarantees of privacy as differential privacy.
In this work, our goal is to perform WaveCluster under differential privacy. The focus of initial work on differential privacy [12] [13] [14] [15] 23] concerned the theoretical proof of its feasibility on various data analysis tasks, e.g., histogram and logistic regression. More recent work has focused on practical applications of differential privacy for privacy-preserving data publishing. An approach proposed by Barak et al. [6] encoded marginals with Fourier coefficients and then added noise to the released coefficients. Hay et al. [20] exploited consistency constraints to reduce noise for histogram counts. Xiao et al. [37] proposed Privelet, using wavelet transforms to reduce noise for histogram counts. Cormode et al. [10] indexed data by kd-trees and quad-trees, building the noisy trees with effective budget allocation strategies. Qardaji et al. [31] proposed uniform-grid and adaptive-grid methods to derive appropriate partition granularity in differentially private synopsis publishing. Xu et al. [38] proposed the NoiseFirst and StructureFirst techniques for constructing optimal noisy histograms, using dynamic programming and Exponential mechanism. These differentially private data publishing techniques are specifically crafted for answering range queries. However, synthesizing the dataset and applying WaveCluster on top of it often render WaveCluster results useless, since these techniques do not capture the essence of WaveCluster and introduce too much unnecessary noise.
Another important line of prior work focuses on integrating differential privacy into other practical data analysis tasks, such as regression analysis, model fitting, classification and etc. Chaudhuri et al. [7] proposed a differentially private regularized logistic regression algorithm that balances privacy with learnability. Zhang et al. [40] proposed a differentially private approach for logistic and linear regressions that involve perturbing the objective function of the regression model, rather than simply introducing noise into the results. Friedman et al. [16] incorporated differential privacy into several types of decision trees and subsequently demonstrated the tradeoff among privacy, accuracy and sample size. Using decision trees as an example application, Mohammed et al. [29] investigated a generalization-based algorithm for achieving differential privacy for classification problems.
Differentially private cluster analysis has also been studied in prior work. Zhang et al. [39] proposed differentially private model fitting based on genetic algorithms, with applications to k-means clustering. McSherry [27] introduced the PINQ framework, which has been applied to achieve differential privacy for k-means clustering using an iterative algorithm [36] . Nissim et al. [30] proposed the sample-aggregate framework that calibrates the noise magnitude according to the smooth sensitivity of a function. They showed that their framework can be applied to k-means clustering under the assumption that the dataset is well-separated. These research efforts primarily focus on centroid-based clustering, such as k-means, which is most suited for separating convex clusters and presents insufficient spatial information to detect clusters with complex shapes, e.g. concave shapes. In contrast to these research efforts, we propose techniques that enforce differential privacy on WaveCluster, which is not restricted to well-separated datasets, and can detect clusters with arbitrary shapes.
PRELIMINARIES

Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [12] is a recent privacy model, which guarantees that an adversary cannot infer an individual's presence in a dataset from the randomized output, despite having knowledge of all remaining individuals in the dataset. 
The parameter indicates the level of privacy, and we refer to it as the privacy budget. Appropriate allocation of the privacy budget for a computational process is important for reaching a favorable trade-off between privacy and utility. The most common strategy to achieve -differential privacy is to add noise to the output of a function. The magnitude of introduced noise is calibrated by the privacy budget and the sensitivity of the query function. The sensitivity of a query function is defined as the maximum difference between the outputs of the query function on any pair of neighboring databases:
There are two common approaches for achieving -differential privacy: Laplace mechanism [14] and Exponential mechanism [28] .
Laplace Mechanism: The output of a query function f is perturbed by adding noise from the Laplace distribution with probability density function f (x|b) = 1 2b
The following randomized mechanism A l satisfies -differential privacy:
Exponential Mechanism: This mechanism returns an output that is close to the optimum, with respect to a quality function. A quality function q(D, r) assigns a score to all possible outputs r ∈ R, where R is the output range of f , and better outputs receive higher scores. A randomized mechanism Ae that outputs r ∈ R with probability
satisfies -differential privacy, where S(q) is the sensitivity of the quality function. Differential privacy has two properties: sequential composition and parallel composition. Sequential composition is that given n independent randomized mechanisms A1, A2, . . . , An where Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies i-differential privacy, a sequence of Ai over the dataset D satisfies -differential privacy, where = n 1 ( i). Parallel composition is that given n independent randomized mechanisms A1, A2, . . . , An where Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies -differential privacy, a sequence of Ai over a set of disjoint data sets Di satisfies -differential privacy.
WaveCluster
WaveCluster is an algorithm developed by Sheikholeslami et al. [33, 34] for the purpose of clustering spatial data. It works by using a wavelet transform to detect the boundaries between clusters. A wavelet transform allows the algorithm to distinguish between areas of high contrast (high frequency components) and areas of low contrast (low frequency components). The motivation behind this distinction is that within a cluster there should be low contrast and between clusters there should be an area of high contrast (the border). WaveCluster has the following steps:
Quantization: Quantize the feature space into grids of a specified size, creating a count matrix M .
Wavelet Transform: Apply a wavelet transform to the count matrix M , such as Haar transform [3] and Biorthogonal transform [26] , and decompose M to the average subband that gives the approximation of the count matrix (W ) and the detail subband that has the information about the boundaries of clusters.
Significant Grid Identification: Identify the significant grids from the average subband W . WaveCluster constructs a sorted list L of the positive wavelet transformed values obtained from W and compute the pth percentile of the values in L. The values that are below the pth percentile of L are non-significant values, and their corresponding grids are considered as non-significant grids. The data points in the non-significant grids are considered as noise.
Cluster Identification: Identify clusters from the significant grids using connected component labeling algorithm [21] (two grids are connected if they are adjacent), map the clusters back to the original multi-dimensional space, and label the data points based on which cluster the data points reside in.
Parameters. WaveCluster has four parameters to specify: num_grid (g1, g2, . . . , gn): the number of grids that the ndimensional space is partitioned into along each dimension. For the brevity of description, we simply use g to refer to the partitions of the n-dimensional space (g1, g2, . . . , gn).
densitythreshold (p): a percentage value p that specifies p% of the values in L are non-significant values. For ease of presentation, we use k = (1 − p)|L| to represent the top k values in L and their corresponding grids are considered as significant grids. level: a wavelet decomposition level, which indicates how many times a wavelet transform is applied. The larger the level is, the more approximate the result is. In our techniques, we set level to 1 since a smaller level value provides more accurate results [34] .
wavelet: a wavelet transform to be applied. Haar transform [3] is one of the simplest wavelet transforms and widely used, which is computed by iterating difference and averaging between odd and even samples of a signal (or a sequence of data points). Other com-monly used wavelet transforms include Biorthogonal transform [26] , Daubechies transform [11] , and so on.
Differentially Private WaveCluster
Motivating Scenario. Consider a scenario with two participants: the data owner (e.g. hospitals) and the querier (e.g. data miner). The data owner holds raw data and has the legal obligation to protect individuals' privacy while the querier is eager to obtain cluster analysis results for further exploration. The goal of our work is to enable the data owner to release cluster analysis results using WaveCluster while not compromising the privacy of any individual. The data owner has a good knowledge of the raw data and it is not difficult for her to choose the appropriate parameters (e.g. num_grid, densitythreshold) for non-private WaveCluster. The parameters chosen for the non-private setting are directly used for the private setting, and thus the data owner does not need to infer another set of parameters for the private setting.
Problem Statement. Given a raw data set D, appropriate WaveCluster parameters for D and a privacy budget , our goal is to investigate an effective approach A such that A (1) satisfies -differential privacy, and (2) achieves high utility of the private WaveCluster results with regard to the utility metrics U .
APPROACHES
In this section, we present four techniques for achieving differential privacy on WaveCluster.
Baseline Approach (Baseline)
A straightforward technique to achieve differential privacy on WaveCluster is as follows: (1) adapt an existing -differential privacy preserving data publishing method to get the noisy description of the data distribution, such as a set of contingency tables or a spatial decomposition tree [10, 31, 37, 38] ; (2) generate a synthetic dataset according to the noisy description; (3) apply WaveCluster on the synthetic dataset. We refer to this technique as Baseline and its pseudocode can be found in [8] .
Discussion. Baseline achieves differential privacy on WaveCluster through the achievement of differential privacy on data publishing. The adapted -differential privacy preserving data publishing method is designed for answering range queries. The noisy descriptions of the data distribution may contain negative counts for certain partitions since the noise distribution is Laplacian with zero mean. These negative counts do not affect the range query accuracy too much since zero-mean noise distribution smooths the effect of noise. However, when the method is used for generating a synthetic dataset, the noisy negative counts are reset as zero counts, causing the data distribution to change radically and further leading to the severe deviation in differentially private WaveCluster results.
Private Quantization (PrivQT)
To address the challenge faced by Baseline, we propose techniques that enforce differential privacy on the key steps of WaveCluster. Our first approach, called Private Quantization (PrivQT), introduces independent Laplacian noise in the quantization step to achieve differential privacy. In the quantization step, the data is divided into grids and the count matrix M is computed. To ensure differential privacy in this step, we rely on the Laplace mechanism that introduces independent Laplacian noise to M . Clearly, if we change one individual in the input data, such as adding, removing or modifying an individual, there is at most one change in one entry of M . According to the parallel composition property of differential privacy, the noise amount introduced to each grid is Lap( 1 ), given a privacy budget . Since the following steps of WaveCluster
Algorithm 1 PrivTHR
Input: Dataset D, num_grid g, density threshold p, wavelet transform w, differential privacy budget , allocation percentage α Output: A set of differentially private clusters 1: procedure P rivT HR(D, g, p, w, , α) 2:
7:
return ConnCompLabel(W , d ) 10: end procedure 11: procedure NOISYCOUNTOFNONPOSVALUES(D, g, w, ) 12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
return |Z| 17: end procedure are carried on using the differentially private count matrix M , the clusters derived from these steps are also differentially private. The pseudocode of PrivQT can be found in [8] .
Discussion. Although PrivQT achieves differential privacy, the noisy count matrix M significantly distorts the number of noisy positive values in M and consequently the clustering results. As Laplacian distribution is symmetric and has zero-mean, approximately half of the zero-count grids become noisy positive-count grids due to positive noise. These noisy positive-count grids may cause their corresponding wavelet transformed values in W to become positive (depending on the targeted wavelet transform), which will inappropriately participate in the computation of k , the private version of k. Due to the significant distortion of k , the utility of PrivQT improves marginally even for a large privacy budget.
Private Quantization with Refined Noisy
Density Threshold (PrivTHR)
The limitation of PrivQT lies in the severe distortion of k by Laplacian noise introduced into count matrix M . To mitigate the distortion, we propose a technique, PrivTHR, which prunes a portion of noisy positive values in W to refine the computation of k . Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of PrivTHR.
PrivTHR first introduces random noise to the count matrix M , similar to PrivQT, and obtains a noisy count matrix M (Line 2). PrivTHR then applies a wavelet transform on M to obtain W (Line 3). W is then turned into a list L that keeps only positive values and the values in L is sorted in ascending order (Line 4). Thus, only the positive values in W will be used for computing k based on the specified density threshold p. To reduce the distortion of k , starting from the smallest noisy positive values in L , PrivTHR discards the first non-positive values in W are turned into positive values due to the randomness of Laplacian noise. Since |Z| partially describes the data distribution and releasing |Z| without protection may leak private information, PrivTHR also introduces Laplacian noise to |Z|, ensuring the whole process correctly enforces differentially privacy (Lines 11-17) . The noise introduced to |Z| depends on the wavelet transform used to compute W . For example, if we use Haar transform for n-dimensional data, a value in W is computed by applying average for two neighboring elements along each dimension. Since any single change in the input only causes one entry of the count matrix M to change by 1, the change of M causes at maximum one value in W to change, and thus causes |Z| to change by 1 at maximum, i.e., the sensitivity of |Z| is 1 1 . Finally, PrivTHR obtains d as the top k th value in L (Line 8), where any value in L greater than d is considered as a significant value, and applies the connected component labeling algorithm to identify clusters of significant grids (Line 9).
Budget Allocation. PrivTHR first introduces Laplacian noise in the quantization step using a privacy budget 1 = α , where 0 < α < 1. In the significant grid identification step, PrivTHR further introduces Laplacian noise to |Z| using the remaining privacy budget 2 = (1 − α) . Based on utility analysis in Section 5.2.2, 2 should be allocated with a smaller amount of budget than 1.
Our empirical results in Section 7 further show the impact of α on clustering accuracy.
Private Quantization with
PrivTHR EM first introduces Laplacian noise to the count matrix M , which is similar to PrivQT and PrivTHR. After that, we obtain a noisy count matrix M (Line 2) and the corresponding W (Line 3). Different from the previous two techniques that compute k from W , PrivTHR EM derives k from W using Exponential mechanism (Lines 7-15). In this case, although the sorted list derived from W is severely distorted in PrivTHR EM , the derivation of k from W is not affected by the distorted W . Given sufficient privacy budget, k derived from W using Exponential mechanism is reasonably accurate, compared to the case when k is derived from W .
The quality function fed into the Exponential mechanism is [10] : , its rank is rank(Wi). For example, if x ∈ (W2, W1], rank(x) = rank(W1) = 1. Similar to PrivTHR, when using Haar transform, any single change in the input causes only one value in W to change. Thus, at maximum one value will be added into or removed from L, causing the outcome of q(L, X) to be changed by 1, i.e., the sensitivity of q(L, X) is 1 2 . Plugging in the above quality function into Exponential mechanism, we obtain the following algorithm: for any value x ∈ (0, M ax], the Exponential mechanism (EM) returns x with probability
) (Line 12). Since all the values in a partition have the same probability to be chosen, a random value from the partition P ti = (Wi−1, Wi] will be chosen with the probability proportional to |P ti| * exp(− 2 |i − k|). In other words, once k is chosen, PrivTHR EM further computes a uniform random value d from P ti (Line 13), and any value in L greater than d is considered as a significant value. Budget Allocation. Similar to PrivTHR, the privacy budget is split between two steps: introduction of Laplacian noise in quantization and obtaining k using Exponential mechanism. Previous empirical experiments [10] on splitting budgets between obtaining noisy median and noisy counts suggest that, 30% vs. 70% budget allocation strategy performs best. Specifically, 70% of budget is allocated for obtaining noisy count matrix M (Line 2) and the remaining budget is allocated for computing k (Line 4). 11: 
Algorithm 2 PrivTHR
k = (1 − p)|L| 12: k = ExponentialMechanism(L,k, ) 13: d = UniformRandom(L, k ) 14:
PRIVACY AND UTILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the privacy analysis and utility analysis of the proposed techniques PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM .
Privacy Analysis
PrivQT introduces independent Laplacian noise Lap( 1 ) to grid counts, which are computed on disjoint datasets. According to the parallel composition property of differential privacy described in Section 3.1, the privacy cost depends only on the worst guarantee of all computations over disjoint datasets. Therefore, PrivQT isdifferentially private.
PrivTHR splits privacy budget into two parts. First, for private quantization, adding Laplacian noise Lap( ) to the true count of nonpositive values in W , which achieves (1 − α) -differential privacy. Using the composition property of differential privacy, PrivTHR achieves -differentially private since = α + (1 − α) .
Similar to PrivTHR, PrivTHR EM has two steps of randomization: private quantization and obtaining k . Private quantization achieves α -differential privacy according to Laplace mechanism and parallel composition property. Sampling k by Exponential mechanism consumes budget of (1 − α) , which achieves (1 − α) -differential privacy. According to the composition property of differential privacy, PrivTHR EM is -differentially private.
Utility Analysis
In this section, we present utility guarantees of PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM with theoretical analysis. In the private results of WaveCluster, PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM return a list of noisy significant grids. To quantify the utility of PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM , we consider finding significant grids whose wavelet transformed values surpass a threshold to be similar to finding the top-k frequent itemsets whose frequencies surpass a threshold. In significant grid identification, L is the list of positive wavelet transformed values from W sorted in ascending order, Z represents the set of non-positive values from W , and all the top-k values in L correspond to significant grids, where k = (1 − p)|L|.
Utility Analysis for PrivQT.
We first provide the analysis of difference between k and k in PrivQT. In PrivQT, the difference between k and k depends on two factors: (1) a set of non-positive values in Z becoming noisy positive, Z p = {W Z |W Z = WZ +N oise, WZ ∈ Z, W Z > 0}, where W Z is the noisy value of zero value in Z, and (2) a set of positive values in L becoming noisy non-positive,
Analysis of |Z p |. In PrivQT, since we are adding Lap( 1 ) noise to each grid count and the Haar transform computes the average from four adjacent grids, the noise added into a wavelet transformed value is the sum of four i.i.d. samples from the Laplace distribution. The sum of h i.i.d. Laplace distributions with mean 0 is the difference of two i.i.d. Gamma distributions [24] , referred to as distribution T . Distribution T is a polynomial in |x| divided by e |x| , which is a symmetric function and thus the probability for distribution T to produce positive values is 1 2 . Thus, the events of values in Z adding positive noise from distribution T conform to the Binominal Distribution with parameters |Z| and 1 2 , and its expected value is |Z| 2 . Analysis of |L n |. For L n , each value is added the noise conforming to the symmetric distribution T . The probability density function of
fT (y > −Wi), Wi ∈ L, and its expected value E[|L n |] is |L| n=1 fT (y ≤ −Wi). E[|L n |] is large when Wi is small and there is limited privacy budget. The datasets that are interesting for clustering always have high-density cluster centers and low-density cluster borders. Only those values corresponding to border grids are possible to become noisy non-positive and the size of border grids is relatively small. Therefore, E[|L n |] is a small constant. We refer to the value of |L n | as θ in the following analysis.
− θ). For those datasets that are interesting in the context of clustering, |Z| is pretty large compared to the whole space since Z is used to separate different clusters. What is more, dense areas within clusters are typically larger than the space of cluster borders with low density, i.e. θ is far smaller than |Z| 2 . In PrivQT, |Z| 2 dominates the difference between k −k, which increases false positive rate. In PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM , we use different strategies to minimize the difference between k and k. , and γ = 8 ln (
), then with probability at least (1 − ω) 2 , (1) all value in L greater than W k min + γ are output, where k min = k + (1 − p)(η1 − θ), and (2) no values in L less than W k max − γ are output, where
PROOF. In PrivQT, k = (1 − p)(|L| + |Z p | − |L n |). Since |Z p | follows Binominal distribution with parameters |Z| and 1 2 and |L n | is noted as a small value θ, k follows the Binomial distribution and decides the number of values in L that become output. Let
We can also derive the bound of γ, i.e., the noise added to each value in L ∪ Z based on ω. For Haar wavelet transform, each value in L ∪ Z is added the noise that is the sum of 4 Laplacian random variables divided by 2 (i.e., 
4(|L|+|Z|) ω
). For constant ω, γ = O( ln(4(|L|+|Z|)) ). Subclaim (1) can be derived based on (a) with probability at least 1 − ω, k ≥ k min and (b) with probability at least 1 − ω, the noise of each value in L being within [− ]. Detailed proof can be found in [8] . Subclaim (1) requires both conditions (a) and (b) to hold, and thus the probability is at least (1 − ω) 2 . Similar as k min , we can derive the upper bound k max of k given ω.
), which is symmetric with respect to |Z| 2 . Thus, the probability of sampling a value from the range [0, η2] is the same as sampling a value from the range ) will suffice. Subclaim (2) can be proved based on (c) with probability at least 1 − ω, k ≤ k max and (b) with probability at least 1 − ω, the noise of each value in L being within [− ]. As subclaim (2) requires both conditions (c) and (b) to hold, the probability is at least (1 − ω) 2 .
For other wavelet transforms that use circular convolutions, such as Biorthogonal transform, the derivation for the bounds of k with η1 and η2 remains the same since |Z p | following Binomial distribution is independent of any wavelet transform being adapted. Thus, our framework is extensible to other wavelet transforms, and the bound of noise magnitude γ depends on the amount of adjacent grid counts involved in computing a wavelet transformed value.
Utility Analysis for PrivTHR.
THEOREM 2. In PrivTHR with Haar transform, given 0 < ω < ), then with probability at least
where
− β), and (2) no values in L less than W k max − γ are output, where
PROOF. In PrivTHR, we allocate 1 for private quantization and 2 for obtaining |Z| , which makes k ) ± (β + θ) by THEOREMs 4 and 5, where θ is a small constant and β is small when sufficient budget is provided.
Utility Analysis for
, and γ = PROOF. In PrivTHR EM , we allocate 2 for deriving k from W by employing Exponential Mechanism, a general method proposed in [28] . The probability of selecting a rank i is |P ti| * exp(− Let 1 − ω be the probability of sampling a k where k − k ≤ η1, then
) will suffice. Let 1 − ω be the probability of sampling a k where k − k ≤ η2, then
) will suffice. The proof of γ and subclaims (1) and (2) are the same as THEOREM 4.
Analysis of PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM . By THEOREMs 5 and 6, the accuracy for sampling k in PrivTHR is dominated by 
Depending on the data distribution, PrivTHR EM may present better or worse utility guarantee than PrivTHR: ln(
, and the accuracy for sampling k in PrivTHR EM becomes more sensitive to 2 than PrivTHR; ln(
becomes negative when
is less than 1, and the utility guarantee for PrivTHR EM becomes better.
QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
To quantitatively assess the utility of differentially private WaveCluster, we propose two types of measures for measuring the dissimilarity between true and differentially private WaveCluster results. The first type, DSGC , measures the dissimilarity of the significant grids and the clusters between true and private results. The second type focuses on observing the usefulness of differentially private WaveCluster results for further data analysis. The reason is that a slight difference in the significant grids or clusters may cause a significant difference when using the WaveCluster results. In this paper, we choose a typical application of further data analysis: building a classifier from the clustering results to predict unlabeled data [19] . The classifier built from true WaveCluster results is called the true classifier clft while the classifier built from differentially private WaveCluster results is called the private classifier clfp. To measure the dissimilarity between clft and clfp, we propose two metrics: OCM and 2CE.
Dissimilarity of Significant Grids and Clusters
DSGC considers the dissimilarities of significant grids and clusters. Assume that there are t clusters of true significant grids and s clusters of differentially private significant grids. t might not be equal to s, and the cluster labels in t true clusters and s private clusters are completely arbitrary. To accommodate these differences, we adopt the Hungarian method [25] , a combinatorial optimization algorithm, to solve the matching problem between t true clusters and s private clusters while minimizing the matching difference.
When 
Dissimilarity of Classifier Prediction
OCM and 2CE measure the dissimilarity between clft and clfp. We name this way of evaluation as "clustering-first-thenclassification": given a set of unlabeled data points, we use a portion of the data points (e.g., 90%) to compute WaveCluster results, where each cluster is a set of significant grids. Using the significant grids with cluster labels as training data, we build classifiers clft and clfp, and use them to predict the classes for the remaining data points (e.g., 10%).
Dissimilarity of Classifiers based on Optimal Class Matching (OCM ). OCM measures the dissimilarity between the two sets of classes predicted by clft and clfp for the same test samples. We use Lt to denote the set of classes predicted by clft and Lp to denote the set of classes predicted by clfp. Since Lt and Lp are completely arbitrary, we exploit the Hungarian method to find the optimal matching between Lt and Lp.
Assume that a class Lt,i predicted by clft is matched to a class Lp,j predicted by clfp, forming a class pair. We compute the count of common test samples in the class Lt,i and the class Lp,j, and sum the common test samples in each class pair to compute CT :
Here c1 is the count of classes in Lt and c2 is the count of classes in Lp, and we assume c1 ≥ c2. Since there are many possible mappings from the classes in Lt to the classes in Lp, we use the Hungarian method to find the optimal mapping that maximizes CT . Based on CT and the total count of the test samples T T , we derive the dissimilarity OCM :
When the dissimilarity is smaller, the differentially private WaveCluster results are more similar to the true WaveCluster results and maintain high utility for classification use.
Dissimilarity of Classifiers based on 2-Combination Enumeration (2CE). 2CE measures the dissimilarity between clft and clfp based on relationships of every pair of test samples, i.e., whether two samples are in the same class. Essentially, given a pair of test samples A and B, we say A and B are classified consistently either (1) clft(A) = clft(B) and clfp(A) = clfp(B) or (2) clft(A) = clft(B) and clfp(A) = clfp(B). 2CE is the ratio of the count of test sample pairs that are not classified consistently over the total number of test sample pairs, which is the set of 2-combination of the test samples. 2CE uses pairs of test samples to eliminate the need of finding the optimal matching between the classes predicted by clft and clfp.
EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the proposed techniques using three datasets that are widely used in previous clustering algorithms [1] , and one large scale dataset derived from the check-in information in Gowalla 3 geo-social networking website [9] , which was used to evaluate gridbased clustering algorithms in [35] .
Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we compare the performances of the four techniques, Baseline, PrivQT, PrivTHR, and PrivTHR EM , on the four datasets using two types of measures proposed in Section 6. We use Haar transform as the wavelet transform and set the wavelet decomposition level to 1 for the four techniques. Baseline uses the adaptive-grid method [31] for synthetic data generation. The classification algorithm used for measuring OCM and 2CE is C4.5 decision tree algorithm [32] . We conduct experiments with privacy budgets ranging from 0.1 to 2.0; for each budget and each metric, we apply the techniques on each dataset for 10 times and compute their average performances. All experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel 2.67GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. 3 https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html.
Datasets. The four clustering datasets contain different data shapes that are specially interesting for clustering. Figures 2 shows the WaveCluster results on the four datasets under certain parameter settings of grid size g and density threshold p. Any two adjacent clusters are marked with different colors. The points in red color are identified as noise, which fall into the non-significant grids. DS1 is a dataset containing 15 Gaussian clusters in convex shapes. It contains 30000 data points. The center area of each cluster has higher density and is resistant to noise. However, the overlapped area of two adjacent clusters has lower density and is prone to be affected by noise, which might turn the corresponding non-significant grids into significant grids and further connect two separate clusters. DS2 is a dataset with 3 spiral clusters. It contains 31200 data points. Some noisy significant grids are very likely to bridge the gap between adjacent spirals and merge them into one cluster. DS3 is a data dataset with 5 various shapes of clusters, including concave shapes. It contains 31520 data points. There are two clusters that both contain two sub components and a narrow line-shape area that bridges those two sub components. The narrow bridging area has low density and might be turned into non-significant grids, causing a cluster to split into two clusters. Gowalla is the check-in dataset resembling the world map, which records time and location information of users' check-ins. We use only the location information for evaluation. There are about 6.4M records. Such large size makes it infeasible to run experiments with C4.5 and Baseline due to memory constraints. Thus, similar to [31] , we sampled 1M records from the dataset for evaluation.
Comparing Private k With True k
We first measure the differences between the true k and private k s on each dataset with ranging from 0.1 to 2.0. Detailed results can be found in [8] . Our results show that for all datasets, when ≥ 0.5, the relative errors of k , i.e., the results, both PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM achieve smaller DSGC values than Baseline and PrivQT on all four datasets for all budgets. The reason is that though the noisy significant grids generated by Baseline and PrivQT may be similar to the true significant grids, these noisy significant grids result in very different shapes of clusters and thus a large value of DSGC , while PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM preserve more accurate cluster shapes. For example, in DS3, the narrow line-shape areas and the gap between two adjacent clusters are sensitive to noise. If some noisy significant grids appear in these areas, two clusters may be merged into one; if some significant grids disappear due to noise, one cluster might be split into two. Such changes cause DSGC to increase significantly. Unlike the other techniques, PrivQT benefits little from the increased privacy budgets. For PrivQT, the difference between k and k in PrivQT is dominated by |Z| 2 . Increasing privacy budgets can only reduce noise magnitude and cannot smooth such difference.
Results of DSGC
Comparison to F-Measure Results. Clustering analysis usually uses F-measure as a representative external validations to measure the similarity between the ground truth (known class labels) and the clustering results [2] . In our experiments, we consider the true WaveCluster results as the ground truth. The detailed results can be found in [8] . Our results show that PrivQT and Baseline achieve high F-measure scores (more than 0.8) for almost all budgets in DS1, even though the private results produced by PrivQT and Baseline are quite different from the true results. For example, when = 0.1, the private results of PrivQT and Baseline have more than 30 clusters while the true results have only 15 clusters. On the contrary, Figure 3 (a) shows that DSGC is able to clearly differentiate the performances of the four techniques. The reason is that unlike DSGC that allows only one-to-one mapping between true and private clusters, F-measure allows one-to-many or many-to-one mapping between true and private clusters. If the size of true clusters is larger than that of private clusters, F-measure allows many to one mapping, and vice versa. Thus, DSGC presents more strict evaluation than F-measure in computing similarity/dissimilarity.
Results of OCM and 2CE
Results of OCM . Figure 3 (e)-(h) show the results of OCM for the four techniques. As shown in the results, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM achieve smaller OCM values than Baseline and PrivQT for all datasets when ranges from 0.5 to 2.0. When is greater than 0.5, the OCM values of PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM are less than 0.15 on DS1, DS3, and Gowalla, indicating the private classifier clfp maintains highly similar prediction results as the true classifier clft. On DS2 that contains 3 spirals, PrivTHR EM still maintains a very low OCM value (< 0.1) when is greater than 0.5 while PrivTHR has a slightly worse OCM value (ranging from 0.1 to 0.2). Such results show that PrivTHR EM is more resilient to noise for concave-shaped data than PrivTHR.
Results of 2CE. Figure 3 (i)-(l) show the results of 2CE for the four techniques. As shown in the results, PrivTHR and PrivTHR EM achieve smaller 2CE values than Baseline and PrivQT for all datasets when ranges from 0.5 to 2.0.
In general, all four techniques exhibit similar trends of 2CE as their trends in OCM . On DS1, all four techniques have very low 2CE values (< 0.1) though their corresponding OCM values are much higher (ranging from 0.05 to 0.5). The reason is that 2CE captures the relationships between data points while OCM focuses on the mappings of classes. If there are k test samples out of N total samples having different prediction results in the true and private results, 2CE expresses the differences as C(k, 2) + k(N − k) over the total combinations of test samples C(N, 2), while OCM expresses the differences as k over N . On DS1, the k test samples are predicted to be in the same cluster in the private results and C(k, 2) becomes close to 0. In this case, only k(N − k) matters in the computation of 2CE. Given that C(N, 2) is much larger than N and k(N − k) when N of DS1 is about 30,000, 2CE has a smaller value than OCM for measuring the differences, and thus is less sensitive to the noise on DS1.
Budget Allocation for PrivTHR. Based on the utility analysis Section 5.2.2, 1 for private quantization affects the accuracy of γ, and 2 for obtaining |Z| affects the accuracy of β. As the constant factor of γ, ), more budget should be allocated for 1 to achieve better utility. We evaluate the values of DSGC of PrivTHR on DS1 under different budget allocation strategies, ranging from 1% for 1 to 99% for 1. Based on the results, the budget allocation strategy with 90% for 1 and 10% for 2 performs the best. The results of other measures on DS1 show the similar results, and the results of all the two types of measures on other datasets also show the similar results.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have addressed the problem of cluster analysis with differential privacy. We take a well-known effective clustering algorithm called WaveCluster, and propose several ways to introduce randomness in the computation of WaveCluster. We also devise several new quantitative measures for examining the dissimilarity between the non-private and differentially private results and the usefulness of differentially private results in classification. In the future, we will investigate under differential privacy other categories of clustering algorithms, such as hierarchical clustering.
